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After a failure or attack the structure of a complex network changes due to node removal. Here,
we show that the degree distribution of the distorted network, under any node disturbances, can be
easily computed through a simple formula. Based on this expression, we derive a general condition
for the stability of non-correlated finite complex networks under any arbitrary attack. We apply
this formalism to derive an expression for the percolation threshold fc under a general attack of the
form fk ∼ k
γ , where fk stands for the probability of a node of degree k of being removed during the
attack. We show that fc of a finite network of size N exhibits an additive correction which scales
as N−1 with respect to the classical result for infinite networks.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc,89.75.Fb,02.50.Cw
The stability of graphs against various disrupting
events is a central issue in the study of complex net-
works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. If information is
transported across a network, as is the case of epidemics
across social networks or information broadcast through
Internet, the “damage” of some nodes can dramatically
affect the dynamics of the system. In the context of dis-
ease spreading, this could lead to an epidemic extinction,
while in communications to a halt of information broad-
cast [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Both, the topological structure
of the network and the nature of the attack determine the
resulting effect [16]. For example, it has been shown that
scale-free (SF) networks display a high degree of tolerance
against random failures [9], while, on the other hand,
they are quite sensitive against intentional attacks [10].
Clearly, there are various strategies to perform an inten-
tional attack, and each one of them requires a different
level of knowledge on the network topology [16, 17, 18].
A rather general attack, proposed in [19, 20] and that
we will use in this paper, takes the form fk ∼ k
γ , where
fk denotes the probability of a node of degree k of be-
ing removed during the attack, while γ is associated to
the degree of knowledge of the attacker. The analysis of
this attack has revealed that in SF networks an increase
of γ leads to a decrease of the critical fraction of nodes
that must be removed to disintegrate the network, i.e., a
decrease in the percolation threshold fc [19, 20].
Though many results have been derived for infinite SF
networks, very little is known about the stability of finite
networks. Typical examples of small size finite networks
are ad-hoc networks of commercial mobile devices, fre-
quently used for communication [21], temporary peer-to-
peer networks formed by BitTorrent clients for efficient
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download of file [22] and networks of autonomous mo-
bile robots [23]. The operation of these systems relies on
the robustness of the highly dynamical underlying net-
work. Thus, a good understanding on the stability of
these small size networks is imperative for these applica-
tions. Moreover, we can say that in general a comprehen-
sive theory for the stability of arbitrary finite networks
under any node disturbance is still lacking.
In this paper we attempt to shed some light on this
matter by proposing an alternative derivation for the
percolation threshold. Let us clarify that in this paper
we are interested in understanding only the emergence
of a giant component at percolation threshold. Hence,
the term percolation and emergence of giant component
can be considered synonymous. In our approach, in-
stead of applying a generating function formalism to find
an analytic expression for the percolation threshold as
in [1, 2, 17], we used the fact that during an attack the de-
gree distribution of the network changes (see Fig. 1). We
S R
E
FIG. 1: The scheme illustrates an attack as consisting of two
steps: (a) selection of nodes to be removed (see set R), and
(b) cutting of the edges that run from the surviving nodes
(represented by set S) to the set of removed nodes. As the
scheme shows, the attack affects also the degree of the sur-
viving nodes.
2show that the degree distribution of the distorted (un-
correlated) network, under any node disturbances, can
be easily computed through a simple formula. Based
on this expression, we derive a general condition for the
stability of non-correlated complex networks under any
arbitrary attack. This condition applied to the study
of network stability under the general attack proposed
in [19, 20] leads us to a general expression for the perco-
lation threshold fc. We show that fc of a finite network
of size N exhibits an additive correction which scales as
N−1 with respect to the classical result for infinite net-
works [1, 9, 10]. Simulation results confirm all these find-
ings.
Network topology after disturbance. A failure or attack
can be thought in the following way. Let pk be the degree
distribution of the network before the attack. The first
step in the attack is to select the nodes that are going
to be removed. Let us assume that this is performed by
means of fk, where fk represents the probability for a
node of degree k being removed from the network. Note
that the only restriction on fk is 0 ≤ fk ≤ 1. After
the node selection, we divide the network into two sub-
sets, one subset contains the surviving nodes (S) while
the other subset comprises the nodes that are going to
be removed (R). Fig. 1 illustrates this procedure. At
the moment the nodes in R are actually removed, the
degree distribution of the S-nodes is changed due to the
removal of the E edges that run between these two sub-
sets. The probability φ of finding an edge in subset S
that is connected to a node in subset R is expressed as:
φ =
∑
∞
i=0 i pi fi
(
∑
∞
k=0 k pk)− 1/N
. (1)
The reasoning behind this expression is as follows. The
total number of half-edges in the surviving subset, in-
cluding the E links that are going to be removed,
is
∑
∞
j=0 j (N pj) (1 − fj). The probability for a ran-
domly chosen half-edge of being removed is simply∑
∞
i=0 i (N pi) fi/(
∑
∞
k=0 k (N pk)− 1). E is the number
of half-edges in S times this probability, and φ is obtained
by dividing E by the number of half-edges in the subset
S. Notice that the removal of nodes can only lead to a
decrease of the degree of a node. Finally, to calculate the
degree distribution p′k after the attack, we still need to
estimate the probability psq of finding a nodes with degree
q in the surviving subset S (before cutting the E edges).
This fraction takes the simple form:
psq =
(1− fq)pq
1−
∑
∞
i=0 pifi
. (2)
Now we are in condition to compute p′k. Using Eqs. (1)
and (2), we obtain the following expression for p′k:
p′k =
∞∑
q=k
(
q
k
)
φq−k(1− φ)k psq . (3)
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FIG. 2: Degree distribution before (circles), and after (stars)
the attack. In (a) the network topology corresponds to Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs, with 〈k〉 = 5, while in (b) to scale-free networks,
pk ∼ k
−α with α = 2.5 [25]. Symbols correspond to simula-
tions, solid lines to the theoretical p′k, given by Eq.(3), and
dashed curves to the (theoretical) initial pk. In (a) and (b)
the main figure corresponds to networks with N = 105 nodes,
while the inset shows the result for small networks with just
N = 50 nodes.
Eq. (3) can be iteratively evaluated by replacing pk with
p′k into Eqs. (1) to (3). It is instructive to notice that for
failure, i.e. fk = f , and assumingN ≫ 1, Eq. (1) reduces
to φ = f while Eq. (2) becomes psq = pq. In consequence,
from Eq. (3) we retrieve the degree distribution p′k after
failure which reads [9]: p′k =
∑
∞
q=k
(
q
k
)
f q−k(1−f)kpq.
A similar expression has also been used to described p′k
after an ad-hoc attack in scale-free networks with N ≫
1 [10].
Fig. 2 shows a comparison between stochastic simula-
tions (symbols) and Eq. (3) (solid line) for two different
network topologies, namely Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph (a)
and scale-free (SF) networks (b) [25]. Removal of nodes
(and edges) was performed through an attack of the form
fk ∼ k
γ , with γ = 1. In the figure two different system
sizes are shown: N = 105 and N = 50 (figure insets).
3Critical condition. The following expression tells us
whether an infinite network percolates after an attack [9]:
κ′ =
〈k2〉′
〈k〉′
> 2 , (4)
where 〈k〉′ and 〈k2〉′ refer to the first and second mo-
ments of the degree distribution after the attack. We
borrow the critical condition for infinite networks given
by Eq. (4) to define a “percolation” criterion for finite
networks. Thus, by definition we assume that the con-
dition κ′ = 2 determines the point at which the network
breaks down [19, 20]. To compute 〈k〉′ and 〈k2〉′, we
utilize the generating function:
G0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
q=k
(
q
k
)
φq−k(1− φ)kpsq x
k . (5)
After exchanging the order of the sum, the Binomial the-
orem can be applied, and we obtain:
G0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
psq ((x− 1)(1− φ) + 1)
q
. (6)
From Eq. (6), the first two moments can be easily com-
puted as 〈k〉′ = dG0(1)/dx and 〈k
2〉′ = d2G0(1)/dx
2 +
dG0(1)/dx. After some algebra we obtain that the criti-
cal condition given by Eq. (4) takes the form:(∑
k
pk(1− fk)k
) (∑
k
pk(1 − fk)k
2 +
∑
k
pk(fk − 2)k
)
+
1
N
(∑
k
pk(1 − fk)(2 − k)k
)
= 0 .(7)
Eq. (7) determines the stability condition (according to
the given definition) for any uncorrelated network of fi-
nite size under any arbitrary attack. In the limit of
N →∞, Eq. (7) reduces to:
∞∑
k=0
pkk(k(1− fk) + fk − 2) = 0 . (8)
Interestingly, Eq. (8) can be also derived through a more
classical generating function formalism [24].
Generalized attack. In the following, we model the vari-
ous dynamics (attacks) through a generalized equation of
the form: fk = C k
γ , where γ is a real number signifying
the amount of network structure information available
to the attacker to breakdown the network [20], and C is
a constant that we refer to as attack intensity. Clearly,
γ > 0 represents a situation in which high degree nodes
are removed with higher probability, while γ < 0 models
the opposite. The last case is suitable to situations in
which low degree nodes are more prone to fail. We are
interested in knowing, for a given γ, the critical fraction
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FIG. 3: Percolation threshold fc under changes of the at-
tack exponent γ for three different SF networks, pk ∼ k
−α,
with α = 2, 2.5 and 3, and N = 105. Symbols correspond
to stochastic simulations, while solid curves correspond to
Eqs. (9) and (10). The horizontal dashed lines indicate the
asymptotic value of fc given by Eq.(11).
fc of nodes that is required to remove through such at-
tack in order to destroy the network, i.e., the percolation
threshold. Thus, the problem reduces to compute, for
a given γ, the critical attack intensity C∗. Replacing in
Eq. (7) the above definition of fk and after some algebra
we obtain:
C∗ =
1
2q〈kγ+1〉
{[
2〈k〉q −Q− (1/N)
(
q + 〈kγ+1〉
)]
(9)
−
[
Q2 + (1/N)
(
2Q+
(
q + 〈kγ+1〉
)2)
− 4qp〈kγ+1〉
]1/2}
,
where p = 〈k2〉 − 2〈k〉, q = 〈kγ+1〉 − 〈kγ+2〉, Q =
〈kγ+1〉p+ 〈k〉q, and 〈kω〉 is defined as 〈kω〉 =
∑
k k
ω pk.
Since the fraction of removed nodes f after an attack is
f =
∑
k pkfk, the expression for percolation threshold fc
is simply:
fc = C
∗〈kγ〉 . (10)
Fig. 3 illustrates the behavior of fc on three SF networks
(α = 2, 2.5 and 3) upon changes in the attack exponent
γ. The symbols correspond to stochastic simulations per-
formed on the networks of size N = 105, while the black
curves refer to Eqs.(9) and (10). In the numerical ex-
periments we have computed fc following [20]: when the
fraction of removed nodes is fc, the probability F of find-
ing the network with κ′ > 2 is 1/2.
It is interesting to observe that for any SF network,
the minimum fraction Φc of nodes that is required to be
removed to break down network is obtained by taking
the limit γ →∞ of Eq. (10):
Φc = lim
γ→∞
fc(γ, α) = h(α)
1
kM (kM − 1)
(11)
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FIG. 4: Percolation threshold fc as function of N . Symbols
correspond to stochastic simulation, solid curve to Eq. (12),
and dashed curve to the classical result f∞c . The error bars
represent the confidence interval that contains f∞c (N). Simu-
lations were performed with ER networks with average degree
〈k〉 = 3 and maximum degree kM = 5. The inset shows the
scaling of f∞c − fc(N) with respect to N . The best fitting of
the data corresponds to a slope −0.92± 0.05 (dashed line).
where h(α) is h(α) = 〈k2〉−2〈k〉 and kM is the maximum
degree of the original network. Notice that Eq.(11) rep-
resents an attack performed having full knowledge on the
network topology. The asymptotic values corresponding
to Eq.(11) are shown in Fig. 3 as horizontal dashed lines.
Fig. 3 indicates that typically an increase of the infor-
mation about the network topology, resp. γ, helps the
attacker to break down the network with the removal of a
smaller number of nodes. However, information becomes
redundant as the asymptotic value Φc is approached.
Finite network size. To illustrate the effect of network
size N upon the percolation threshold fc(N), we cus-
tomize Eq.(9) for random attack or failure. When γ = 0
and fk is independent of k, we obtain:
fc(N) = f
∞
c +
1
N
(
2− (〈k2〉/〈k〉)
〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
)
, (12)
where f∞c is the well-known percolation threshold for in-
finite networks under failure [1, 9] which reads: f∞c =
1−
[
1/
(
〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1
)]
.
Fig 4 shows a comparison between Eq. (12) (solid
line), f∞c (dashed line), and stochastic simulations (sym-
bols) for ER networks of different sizes. Notice that
Eq. (12) predicts the correct scaling of fc with N , i.e.,
fc(N) − F
∞
c ∼ N
−1. The observed deviation between
Eq. (12) and simulations can be arguably attributed to
correlations effects, which have been ignored in the cur-
rent approach.
Concluding remarks. We have proposed a general pro-
cedure to calculate the distorted degree distribution of
uncorrelated finite size networks under arbitrary fail-
ure/attack. Using the expression for the distorted degree
distribution we have derived the critical condition for the
stability of finite size networks. The formalism has been
further applied to derive an expression for the percola-
tion threshold under a general attack. Finally, it was
shown that the obtained percolation threshold predicts
an additive correction which scales as N−1 with respect
to the classical result for infinite networks, as observed
in simulations.
The results derived throughout this manuscript are
valid only for uncorrelated networks. The effect of cor-
relations on the percolation threshold for finite (and in-
finite) networks remains as one of the major challenges.
Further extensions of this theory will be focused in that
direction.
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